Confession in Ancient Egypt by Assmann, Jan
CONFESSION IN ANCIENT EGYPT
Jan Assmann
There is much to be said about “Ritual and Ethics” in Ancient Egypt, but 
there is hardly anything that could count as a “pattern of repentance”. The 
concept and phenomenology of repentance seem to be alien to ancient Egypt­
ian culture. What comes closest to what we are looking for are “patterns 
of confession” - and I propose to have a closer look at two of them, which 
differ from each other in a very fundamental way: the confessions of work­
men of Deir el Medina inscribed on ex-voto stelae during the Ramesside era 
(13th and 12th cent. B.C.E.) and the “negative confession” or “declaration 
of innocence” the deceased is supposed to recite before a divine tribunal 
before entering the other world.
1. Confession in the Context of Illness and Healing (Guilt as Separation
and Concealment)
During the 13th cent. B.C.E., a most dramatic change occurred in Egypt­
ian religion and mentality1. Until then, misfortunes were attributed to demons, 
evil spirits, enemies and their magic, and magic was considered to be a 
weapon, given to mankind by the creator himself in order to ward off these 
undesirable influences2. On the other hand, there existed also a notion of 
a connection between doing and faring, that is, the idea that good actions 
would be rewarded by happiness and success, and that bad actions would 
lead to ruin and misfortune. There is even an Egyptian expression for this 
idea occurring in the very same text that calls magic a weapon to ward off 
evil. In the Instruction for Merikare the teacher says: “A blow is repaid by 
its like: this is the dovetailing of all actions”3. This kind of connectivity, 
however, seems to refer not to divine punishment, but, rather, to a kind of 
immanent providence which the Egyptians call “Ma’at”. Ma’at is what one could 
call “iustitia connectiva”4: the principle that links actions with consequences.
1 For this development see my book Agypten - eine Sinngeschichte (Miinchen: 1996) 
pp. 259-277.
2 On the Instruction for Merikare, see M. Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature, vol. I 
(Berkeley: 1973) p. 106.
3 Ibid., p. 105.
4 See my book Ma’at - Gerechtigkeit und Unsterblichkeit im alten Agypten, 2nd ed. 
(Miinchen: 1995).
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Misfortune, therefore, could be attributed either to the evil influence of some 
demonic agency such as a curse, or to the consequences of one’s own evil 
actions or bad character.
During the New Kingdom, however, a new interpretation gained more 
and more acceptance. According to it, misfortune, especially certain forms 
of illness, might be seen as punishment by an offended deity5. In these cases, 
magic was not considered to be a proper remedy. Rather, steps were taken 
in order to reconcile the offended deity. Some texts, all of them coming from 
the workmen’s village in Deir el Medina, give us some information about 
the procedure. In one of these inscriptions we read:
“I will make this stela in your name
And establish for you this hymn in writing upon it.
For you saved me the draughtsman Nakhtamun”.
Thus said I and you did hearken to me.
Now mark, I do what I have said6.
Here, a certain Nebre, who had this stela erected on behalf of his son 
Nakhtamun, quotes the vow that he made in a situation of distress. Then, 
after a turn for the better, he erected the stela in fulfilment of the vow. If we 
may extrapolate from this and other examples, we arrive at something like 
the following order of events:
1. The first event is the experience of a crisis, in this case a serious illness 
of Nakhtamun.
2. The second event consists in publicly praying to the offended god, in our 
case Amun, and in making a vow to erect a stela in case of salvation.
He made hymns to his name 
because of the greatness of his power.
He made humble entreaties before him, 
in the presence of the whole land 
for the draughtsman Nakhtamun, justified, 
who lay sick unto death,
who was under the might of Amun because of that cow7.
Here, we encounter two motifs that are of prime importance in the con­
text of confession: the motif of public humiliation (“in the presence of the 
whole land”) and the motif of guilt.
5 See F.J. Borghouts, “Divine Intervention in Ancient Egypt and its Manifestation”, 
in Gleanings from Deir el-Medina, eds. R.J. Demaree and J.J. Janssen (Leiden: 1982) pp. 1- 
70.
6 See Agyptische Hymnen und Gebete (= AHG), ed. J. Assmann (Zurich: 1975) No. 148 
B 57-62; M. Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature, II (Berkeley: 1977) p. 107.
7 AHG, No. 147 B 32-38; Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature, p. 106.
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3. The third event consists in the experience of salvation.
I found that the lord of Gods came as the north-wind, 
sweet airs before him,
that he might save the draughtsman of Amun,
Nakhtamun, justified,
son of the draughtsman of Amun in the place of truth 
Nebre, justified,
and bom of the lady Pashed, justified.
He said:
Though the servant was disposed to do evil.
Yet is the lord disposed to be merciful.
The lord of Thebes passes not a whole day in anger.
His wrath is finished in a moment and nought is left.
The wind is turned to us in mercy,
Amun turns with his air.
As thy Ka endures, mayst thou be merciful!
We shall not repeat our misdeed8.
4. The fourth and last event is the erection of the stela.
Sometimes, these stelae were erected in times of distress and contain 
prayers for forgiveness and a promise to tell the power of the god or god­
dess to the whole world. These texts are commonly classified as penitential 
hymns (Bufilieder). In most cases, however, a stela was erected like in our 
example after an experience of healing and salvation. These texts are called 
hymns of thanksgiving (Danklieder). There are many parallels for both forms 
in the Biblical book of Psalms9.
What is most characteristic of these confessions is a certain pathos of 
public announcement, an intention of making known to the whole world a 
private experience of a rather shameful kind. This is how the hymn inscribed 
on Nebre’s stela starts:
1 will make him hymns in his name,
I will give him praise up to the height of heaven 
And over the breadth of the earth.
I will declare his might to him who fares down-stream 
And to him who fares up-stream.
Be ye ware of him!
Herald him to son and daughter,
To the great and the little.
Declare ye him to generations and generations.
To those that exist not yet.
Declare him to the fishes in the stream,
8 AHG Nr. 147, B 46-54; Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature, pp. 106-107.
9 See F. Criisemann, Studien zur Formgeschichte von Hytnnus und Danklied in Israel 
(“WMANT", 32; Neukirchen: 1968).
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To the birds in the heaven.
Herald him to him that knows him not and him that knows him.
Be ye ware of Him!
Let us have a look at some other texts of this genre. The stela of a certain 
Nefer‘abu dedicated to a Theban goddess starts right away with the confes­
sion:
I was an ignorant man and foolish.
Who did not know good from evil.
I wrought the transgression against the peak 
And she chastised me.
I was in her hand by night as by day,
I sat like the woman in travail upon the bearing-stool 
I called upon the wind and it did not come to me.
I was libating to the Peak of the West, the mighty one.
And to every god and every goddess (saying:)
Mark, I shall say to great and little 
That are among the workmen:
Be ye ware of the Peak!
For that a lion is within the Peak.
She smites with the smiting of a savage lion.
She pursues him who transgresses against her.
I called upon my mistress;
I found that she came to me with sweet airs.
She was merciful to me,
After she made me see her hand.
She turned again to me in mercy.
She caused me to forget the sickness that had been upon me.
Lo, the Peak of the west is merciful 
If one calls upon her.
Mark, and let every ear hearken 
That lives upon earth:
Beware the peak of the west!10
Again we meet with some typical motifs. There is the motif of confession 
and the pathos of public annunciation. The text proclaims the power of the 
goddess both in its punishing and in its saving and forgiving aspects. The 
experience of salvation is again introduced by the words “I found” which 
occur again and again in similar contexts.
The same Nefer‘abu erected a stela to Ptah in which he mentions the 
particular sin committed by him in the confession. The inscription starts with 
a title like a literary work.
Beginning of the declaration of the might of Ptah [...] 
by [...] Nefer'abu, justified; he says:
10 AHG No. 149; Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature, pp. 107-109.
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I am a man who swore falsely by Ptah, Lord of Truth,
And he caused me to see darkness by day.
I will declare his might to him that knows him not and to him that knows him,
To little and great.
Be ye ware of Ptah, Lord of Truth!
Lo, he will not leave aside any deed of any man.
Refrain from uttering the name of Ptah falsely.
Lo he that utters it falsely,
Lo he tumbles down.
He caused me to be as the dogs of the street,
I being in his hand.
He caused men and Gods to mark me,
I being as a man that has wrought abomination against his lord.
Righteous was Ptah, Lord of Truth, against me when he chastised me.
Be merciful to me; look upon me that you mayest be merciful11.
The motif of annunciation and publication is here very prominent. I think 
that it is precisely this intention which finds its terminological expression 
in the title “declaration of power”. This even seems to be the designation 
of the genre. The term occurs frequently in this context. Especially the vow 
to proclaim the power of the deity to everybody is couched in the formula 
“I will proclaim your power to the fishes in the river and to the birds in the 
heaven”12, “I will proclaim his power to him who sails upstream and to him 
who sails downstream”13; “I will proclaim your power to him who knows 
you not and to him who knows you”14, etc. As far as the motif of publicity 
is concerned, the idea of proclaiming god’s power to fishes and birds seems 
particularly interesting. Brunner has devoted a little study to this motif15. 
He compares it to Christian ideas of preaching to the animals. But it is obvious 
that we are dealing here with figurative speech. Birds and fishes symbolize 
cosmic realms and the idea of an all-encompassing publicity. The whole 
world is to be told the power of god. The basic idea seems to be that an act 
of divine intervention in the private affairs of an individual requires public 
proclamation. If such an event occurs it has to be told to everybody. The man­
ifestation of divine power is regarded as a miracle and has to be proclaimed. 
The Greek term for this literary form and function is “aretalogia”, the telling 
of the “arete” of god, his power, righteousness and efficacy. In the Greek 
world, especially in Asia Minor but also in all other places of the Hellenistic
11 AHG No. 150; Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature, pp. 109-110.
12 Alan Rowe, “Stela of Huy, Viceroy of Nubia under Tut-Ankh-Amen”, ASAE, 40 (1940) 
p. 47ff; W. Helck, Urkunden der 18. Dynastie (Heft 22 = Urk IV; Berlin: 1958) 2075; Turin 
284.
13 Berlin 20377 = AHG No. 148.
14 Bankes 7 = AHG No. 161.
15 H. Brunner, “Verkiindigung an Tiere”, in Fragen an die altagyptische Literatur, ed. E. Otto 
(Wiesbaden: 1977) pp. 119-124.
6 J. ASSMANN
and Roman worlds we find precisely the same institution. Stelae are 
erected in order to make publicly known the guilt, punishment and salva­
tion of an individual sinner. The idea of publicity and publication seems 
to be inseparably linked to the concept and institution of confession. Two 
reflections may help to better understand this link between confession and 
publication.
Firstly, the manifestation of divine power has to be regarded as a kind of 
revelation. In Egypt, the deities are remote and hidden. They are represented 
on earth in the form of images. Especially the Ramesside texts insist on 
the hiddenness of God16. The more hidden the gods, the more miraculous and 
spectacular are their unexpected manifestations. They have an appellative 
character; there is an obligation to make them known and to spread the mes­
sage. Secondly, there is a sharp contrast between the privacy of sin and the 
publicity of confession. By its very publicity, the act of confessing is able 
to annihilate the sin and guilt of the person. Guilt has an isolating effect. 
By committing a crime, a person separates him/herself from decent society. 
The evildoer forgoes the benefits of common confidence and communication 
and excludes himself from the realm of mutual understanding. By making 
himself opaque or intransparent to his fellows, he shuts himself up in the 
privacy of his guilt. This act of culpable self-isolation can only be repaired 
by an opposite act of public self-thematization or “self-publication”. This 
turn from separation to integration can only be done in public; it necessar­
ily requires visibility and publicity. What is not required here is an internal 
process of turning, of repentance or “contrition”.
This is not to say that the ancient Egyptians were not interested in inner 
life, psychical events and mental attitudes. On the contrary, there are many 
contexts in which it is the heart that counts17. But in the context of these con­
fessions, the heart is rarely ever mentioned.
In the aforementioned cases, the form of confession occurs within a pro­
cedure of healing. Confession is part of a therapy. If the connection between 
guilt and illness has been established, the only way of healing the illness is 
getting rid of the guilt. This can only be done by asking the offended deity 
for forgiveness and reconciliation, and the proper way of receiving forgive­
ness is confession. Suffering is interpreted as a kind of crisis to be over­
come by confession, because the cause of the crisis had been separation and
16 See my book Egyptian Solar Religion in the New Kingdom. Re, Amun and the Crisis of 
Polytheism (London: 1995) pp. 133-155.
17 See H. Brunner, “Das Herz im agyptischen Glauben”, in Das Herz im Umkreis des 
Glaubens, I (Biberach: Dr. Karl Thomae GmbH, 1965) pp. 81-106, repr. in Das Horende Herz. 
Kleine Schriften zur Religions- und Geistesgeschichte Agyptens, ed. H. Brunner (“OBO”, 80; 
Fribourg: 1988) pp. 8-44; J. Assmann, “Zur Geschichte des Herzens im alten Agypten”, in 
Die Eifindung des inneren Menschen, eds. J. Assmann and Th. Sundermeier (Giitersloh: 1993)
pp. 81-112.
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concealment. Confession re-establishes the link that had been broken by 
the evil action and which is a link connecting an individual with society 
and with a god. As long as the evil action remains the secret of the evildoer, 
the separation grows. But the growing gap between the individual, society, 
and the deity can be bridged by breaking the concealment and by making 
the deed public. Speech and language serve as means of re-socialization.
2. Confession in the Context of Death and Immortality (Guilt as Pollu­
tion, Confession as Purification)
In the second part of this article, I would like to compare these confes­
sions to an apparently rather different kind of confession which is a much 
more common and widespread conception in ancient Egypt: the so-called 
“negative confession” which the deceased is supposed to make during the 
judgement of the dead. At first sight, the difference between these two forms 
of confession could not be greater. We shall see, however, that there are 
also common features. Before making the comparison, let me briefly describe 
the confession before the judges of the dead.
According to the classical conception, which dates back at least to the 
15th century B.C.E. and persists until Late Antiquity, every Egyptian indi­
vidual was believed to be summoned after death to a divine tribunal in order 
to confront possible accusations, to be purged of his/her sins and to be “jus­
tified” against his/her enemies18. The central scene or “icon” representing 
this idea of purification and justification is the “psychostasia” or weighing 
of the heart, showing a balance with two scales, one containing the heart of 
the deceased, the other a figure of Ma’at, that is, truth-justice-order. The fig­
ure of Ma’at symbolizes a complex of norms. Guilt is defined as a violation 
of one of these norms. A complex of norms functions both ways: it helps 
to prevent evildoing, but it also generates guilt. This cyclical structure has 
been described and possibly discovered by Saint Paul and may thus be called 
the Pauline cycle. According to Paul, the Law that has been given to man 
in order to show him a guiltless way of life at the same time acts as a gene­
rator of guilt. Without a norm to be violated, there would not be any guilt. 
The Egyptian terminology points to a similar idea. A common denomination 
of the judgement after death is “calculating the difference”. It refers to the 
difference between the norms of Ma’at and an individual life.
The heart, which is so conspicuously absent in our first paradigm of con­
fession, plays a central role in this second paradigm. It symbolizes the “inner
18 On the Egyptian idea of the deadjudgement, its historical development and its influence 
on other cultures, see J.G. Griffiths, The Divine Verdict. A Study of Divine Judgment in Ancient 
Religions (Leiden: 1991).
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self” of the deceased, that is, his memory or conscience where the sins he 
committed during his lifetime are stored. The test of the balance is to ascer­
tain the state of the heart: whether it is full of accumulated guilt which would 
mean that it is heavy, or whether it is full of Ma’at which would mean that 
it is light like a feather.
The notion of accumulation and, thus, of time is central to the concept of 
guilt. Before continuing my description of the judgement after death I would 
like to insert here a short excursus on guilt and time. Ruth Benedict, in her 
book The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, introduced the distinction between 
shame cultures such as Japan and guilt cultures such as Christianity19. Eric 
Dodds elaborated on this distinction in applying it to Homeric and Classi­
cal Greece20. The distinction between shame and guilt is very pertinent to 
our context. Shame is related to perception, to seeing and being seen. The 
notion of guilt, on the other hand, is related to memory, to remembering and 
being remembered. In a shame-culture, a transgression that passes unnoticed 
vanishes and does not constitute a problem. In a guilt-culture, however, even 
unnoticed transgressions stay on in the memory of the wrongdoer, form part 
of his person and constitute a problem that needs to be handled.
The Egyptians made the distinction between face and heart. “In the face” 
means an outward appearance of something; “on the heart” means an inward 
opinion or evaluation of something. The difference between these two 
expressions refers to the difference between a space of intervision and a 
space of interlocution. In the space of intervision, people are striving to form 
and sustain a face to show to each other and the most important concern is 
not to lose this face. In the space of interlocution people are striving not to 
show but to express themselves, to speak and listen to each other, and they 
form organs of expression and understanding. The greatest concern here is 
to remember and to be remembered. In Egyptian anthropology, the heart is 
the seat of understanding and memory. The sphere of shame is horizontally 
structured by social control and mutual perception, and the sphere of guilt 
is vertically structured by reference to the past. The horizontal structure of 
shame - the space of intervision - is dominated by synchrony, the vertical 
structure of guilt, the space of interlocution, is dominated by diachrony. The 
face is directed towards the present and towards synchrony, but the heart is 
the organ extending into past and future. Guilt is closely related to expecta­
tion and memory.
This relationship between guilt and diachrony can be illustrated with 
reference both to Nietzsche and to Egyptian texts. Nietzsche, in his book on 
the Genealogy of Morals, demonstrated the artificiality of social memory,
19 R. Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. Patterns of Japanese Culture (New 
York: 1974) p. 222ff.
20 E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: 1966).
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what he calls the memory of the will and what he believes to be not only a 
human phenomenon but also a human invention, an acquisition in the process 
of civilization. This kind of memory is the exclusive property of man who 
is “the animal that is allowed to make promises”. “Precisely this neces­
sarily forgetful animal - Nietzsche writes - in which forgetting is a power, 
a form of strong health, has cultivated within himself a counter-capability, 
a memory, that enables him in certain cases to suspend (“unhinge”) forget­
ting, viz. in those cases where a promise is to be made: it is therefore not 
only a passive not-being-able-to-get-rid of the engraved impression [...] 
but with an active not-being-willing-to-let-loose, a permanent willing of what 
had once been willed, a veritable memory of the will”21. Man, in order to 
live in civil society, has to cultivate a memory allowing him to make and 
to keep promises, to enter into obligations and to become calculable. This 
is precisely the diachronic space of interlocution, which can only be inhab­
ited by those who possess this memory and diachronic identity (= being 
tomorrow the same as today and yesterday). A number of Egyptian texts 
point in precisely the same direction. In a text from about 2000 we read: 
“a sluggard has no yesterday”22, i.e. no past, no memory, no conscience, no 
responsibility. The opposite, the ideal, is the responsible person who is able 
to remember: “A good character returns to his place of yesterday, for it is 
said: Do to the doer to make him do. It is thanking a man for what he 
does”23. If the past is forgotten, people no longer do anything to each other, 
do no longer repay good with good and evil with evil. In those times, the 
world will be “out of joint”. This is a common complaint in Egyptian liter­
ature. Thus we read in another important text of the same period: “To whom 
shall I speak today? The past is not remembered. Nobody does for the doer 
nowadays”24. If the past is not remembered, the social coherence disinte­
grates and the world turns into an arena of general fighting, a bellum omnium 
contra omnes. “Lo people fight in the arena, for the past is forgotten. Success 
eludes him who no longer knows him whom he has known”25.
21 “Eben dieses notwendig vergeBliche Tier, an dem das Vergessen eine Kraft, eine Form 
der starken Gesundheit darstellt, hat sich nun ein Gegenvermogen angeziichtet, ein Gedachtnis, 
mit Hilfe dessen fur gewisse Falle die VergeBlichkeit ausgehangt wird - fur die Falle namlich, 
daB versprochen werden soil: somit keineswegs bloB als ein passivisches Nicht-wieder-los-werden- 
konnen des einmal eingeritzten Eindrucks [...] sondem ein aktives Nicht-wieder-los-werden- 
wollen, ein fort-und-fort-wollen des einmal Gewollten, ein eigentliches Gedachtnis des Widens”: 
F. Nietzsche, Werke in drei Banden, ed. K. Schlechta, II (Miinchen: 1960) pp. 799-800.
22 Eloquent Peasant B 2:109-10; Assmann, Ma’at, p. 60.
2! Eloquent Peasant B 1:109-110; F. Vogelsang, Kommentar zu den Klagen des Bauem 
(“Unters. z. Gesch. u. Altertumsk. Ag.”, 6; Leipzig: 1913) p. 100.
24 Berlin 3024, 115-16, ed. A. Erman, Das Gesprach eines Lebensmuden mit seiner Seele 
(Berlin; 1896). Many recent translations, i.a. by Erik Homung, Gesdnge vom Nil (Zurich: 
1990) p. 115.
25 Instruction of king Amenemhet I, Millingen 10-11; Section V d-e, ed. Wolfgang Helck, 
Die Lehre des Amenemhet (Wiesbaden: 1969) pp. 35-37. Cf. W. Westendorf, “Die Menschen
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Guilt can thus be defined as forgetfulness of one’s obligations. Nietzsche’s 
basic example is debt, the obligation to pay back one’s debts and to keep 
one’s promises. This relates to the future. The Egyptian example is gratitude, 
the obligation to remember and to answer received benefits. This relates to 
the past. The greatest sin, for the Egyptians, is greed or avarice. Greed 
destroys the diachronic space of interlocution and confines a person in the 
cage of the present moment. Greed destroys this kind of connectivity, which 
connects a human being to its fellows and which connects the present moment 
to the past and the future. The Egyptian expression for this connectivity is 
“Ma’at”. “Ma’at”, in Egyptian thought, is not just an art of living, but an art 
of living-together.
“Ma’at” is the principle of social and temporal connectivity. It keeps time 
and society together. He who lives according to Ma’at remembers and will 
be remembered. Ma’at is not only a body of prescriptions and norms, but also 
a promise of duration and immortality. Violating Ma’at, therefore, does not 
only mean to transgress a norm and to need punishment, but to lose a reward, 
to break a basic contract promising immortality to those who stay within 
Ma’at. Ma’at promises permanence in time, which is conceived of as a mem­
ory-space. A virtuous life bestows permanence to a person so that he/she may 
live on in this memory-space of permanence. Guilt, however, prevents a per­
son from entering into this space, which is conceived as a strictly pure and 
guilt-free sphere where only the guiltless are given access.
Unlike shame, guilt accumulates. This is due to the specific relation 
between guilt and time. Every guilt-culture is, therefore, confronted with the 
problem of how to dispose of accumulated guilt and to develop techniques 
of guilt-disposal such as purification, confession, repentance, penitence etc. 
If these cultural techniques or institutions succeed in purging accumulated 
guilt on a regular base, we may speak of purification cultures. If, however, 
guilt is accumulated in spite of or beyond these cultural efforts of purifica­
tion, we are dealing with real or emphatic guilt cultures. Judaism and Chris­
tianity belong to the second type, ancient Egypt to the first one. In ancient 
Egypt, guilt never accumulates in such a way as to constitute a severe 
cultural problem and a semantic resource. Unlike the Israelites and the Greek 
tragic poets, the Egyptians were never able to make much sense of guilt and 
to convert guilt into a meaningful phenomenon. Egypt clearly belongs to 
the category of guilt-culture and not of shame-culture. But within the cate­
gory of guilt-cultures, Egypt belongs to the sub-category of purification cul­
tures as opposed to “emphatic guilt cultures” for which guilt is a resource 
of cultural meaning.
als Ebenbilder Pharaos”, Gbttinger Miszellen, 46 (1981) pp. 33-42 and E. Blumenthal “Die 
Lehre des Konigs Amenhemet”, Zeitschrift fur agyptische Sprache, 111 (1984) p. 88.
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The Egyptian idea of a judgement of the dead can be interpreted as a 
purification ritual. In its earliest form, this idea is cast into the form of a rit­
ual that forms part of the mummification procedure and is thus closely 
related to ideas of purification and conservation. We are again in a context 
of crisis and healing. This time, the crisis is not illness but death. For the 
Egyptians, however, this does not mean the end. There is much to be done 
about death and dying. It is not the end but another kind of crisis, which can 
be overcome by purification. The mummification ritual concerns the body; 
the justification ritual concerns the soul.
In the present context, the most interesting feature is the fact that the 
justification ritual implies a kind of confession as well as the healing ritual 
we have dealt with in the first part. During the process of the weighing of 
the heart against the feather as the symbol of Ma’at, the deceased is supposed 
to recite a long declaration of innocence or “negative confession”26. The 
confession, which the deceased is supposed to recite before the tribunal, 
is given in negative form. The deceased mentions some eighty-two sins and 
declares not to have done them. This is the contrary of what “confession” 
normally means. The question is, however, to what degree the norms 
mentioned in the “confession” had any importance for the life style of the 
person. My thesis is that this is the whole point of the classical model. The 
ancient or mythical model did not provide any clues as to the conduct of a 
living person. You had to be prepared for any confrontations and any accu­
sations. The classical model is a decisive step in the direction of rational­
ization. Now you knew against which accusations you had to defend your­
self. The classical model thus provides a very close relationship between 
ritual and ethics. The ritual of the judgement of the dead now assumes a 
form in which it was able to influence the lifestyle of the living. In this list, 
specific norms are spelled out, norms that a person has to obey in order 
to qualify for the other world. Thus, one is capable of preparing oneself 
during lifetime for the judgement, by avoiding violating these norms. There 
is no doubt that the ritual must be interpreted as a magic support, helping 
the individual to pass the test of the balance. However, this does not mean 
that it served as a substitute for moral conduct. Magic and morals did not 
exclude each other in ancient Egypt but worked together in the same way 
as magic and medicine worked together in medical practice. In ancient 
Egypt, every physician practised magic along with his purely medical appli­
cations. He would never have thought of magic as a substitute for what we 
would call a proper medical treatment but would always use magic as a com­
plementary way reinforcing his medical treatment. In the same way we must 
conceive of magic and morals working together in the purification ritual of
26 Charles Maystre, Les declarations d’innocence (Kairo: 1937).
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the deceased. Any guilt caused by violating one or more of the so-called 
“laws of the hall of judgement” may be “purged” just by verbal negation: 
“I did not do it”. But this does not mean that a person may not try to avoid 
committing these particular sins as prohibited by the laws of the hall of 
judgement during his/her lifetime27.
One of the most conspicuous traits of the negative confession is its pub­
lic character. This is also the feature that is common to both paradigms of 
confession. The deceased is supposed to make this confession before the 
whole land, represented by the 42 judges. 42 is the number of the nomes. 
Each one of the judges is assigned a specific town and nome. Their totality 
symbolizes the totality of the land which means, the world. Again, we meet 
with the idea that confession means publication. It seems to me obvious that 
the guilt, which the deceased wants to be purged of in the purification rit­
ual of the judgement after death, consists mainly in secret sins beyond reach 
of secular justice. Many, if not most of the sins, which the deceased is to 
abrogate in the negative confession, concern moral prescriptions without 
any legal implications. You could not litigate a person for crimes such as 
making people cry, making too many words, raising your voice, speaking 
inconsiderately, winking to somebody, being arrogant, hot-headed, irasci­
ble, violent, being deaf against words of truth, etc.
The sins to be confessed both in the judgement of the dead and in the 
context of Personal Piety concern crimes and misconduct that lay beyond the 
reach of legal institutions. Radical Enlightenment has made the point that no 
civil society could ever be based on legal institutions alone and that religion 
is a necessary and inevitable invention in order to prevent people from vio­
lating each other28. We meet with this argument as early as the 5th cent. 
B.C.E29. Reductionist as this argument is, we should not close our eyes before 
the fact that sin is a most forceful instrument of dominion and that the Egypt­
ian idea of a judgement of the dead arises in the context of the state of the 
Middle Kingdom and its forceful political theology. The concept of Ma’at has 
unmistakably political implications. However, the same does not necessarily 
apply for the concept of Personal Piety, which views individual life as sub­
ject to divine intervention and the individual person therefore responsible for 
his/her ways of life, not only at the end but constantly during lifetime. This 
view of a god-man relationship implies concepts of divine presence that tran­
scend the sphere of the social and the political and establish a specifically 
religious form of personal commitment and responsibility.
27 See M. Lichtheim, Ma'at in Egyptian Autobiographies and Related Studies (“OBO”, 
120; Fribourg: 1992).
28 Margaret C. Jacobs, The Radical Enlightenment. Pantheists, Freemasons and Republi­
cans (London: 1981).
29 Critias fr. 43 F 19 Snell.
